Shifting Seas: Quad’s Naval Front in the Indo-Pacific

Ships from the Royal Australian Navy, Indian Navy, Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force, and U.S. Navy conduct a formation during Exercise Malabar 2020 in the Bay of Bengal. (Navy)

The Indian Navy convened with Quad naval forces on October 9, bolstering joint security cooperation against Chinese aggression. U.S. Admiral Steve Koehler shared how Exercise Malabar, the Quad’s only multinational exercise, strengthens “combat readiness, maritime integration, and interoperability” with counterparts in the Indian Ocean, underscoring that, “Malabar is a great example of a combined team… deter[ing] conflict and reinforc[ing] our shared commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific.” This year marks the 28th iteration of the multinational exercise.

The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, known as the Quad, is the security partnership between Australia, India, Japan, and the United States. Following the collaborative response to the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004, the four countries founded the Quad in 2007 intending to secure a free and open Indo-Pacific. While China widened its presence in the Indo-Pacific region, the Quad members saw this as a threat to the rules-based order in the region. As a response, the Quad continued to expand its partnership despite China’s concern about this U.S.-led effort of “containment and suppression.” North Korean state media, worried about an “Indo-Pacific North Atlantic Treaty Organization,” echoed Beijing’s concerns by accusing the Quad of “mobiliz[ing] its followers to surround and subdue Russia, China, and other countries to secure its hegemony.” This comment was made in response to the Quad denouncing North Korean missile launches on September 21.

Malabar began as a bilateral exercise between the United States and India in 1992, addressing the shifting security landscape after the Cold War. With India’s growing role in Indian Ocean security, strengthening relations with the United States led Japan and Australia to join Exercise Malabar. Despite China’s growing objections to the position and growth of the exercises, the yearly operation continued. Attempting to ease tensions with China, Australia withdrew from Malabar in 2008, but after a decade, Canberra rejoined its Quad partners in Malabar, signaling a new, stronger commitment to working together.

The evolution of Malabar from a bilateral to a multilateral Quad exercise reveals a new front in the Indo-Pacific. Unlike other bilateral or trilateral naval operations in the surrounding area like U.S.-Philippines or U.S.-Japan-South Korea, Malabar integrates four major democracies focusing on China’s influence and military assertiveness through maritime security. The Quad provides strategic depth by having a wide regional coverage, multipoint presence to monitor and respond to flashpoints, and control of sea lines of communication (SLOCs). Along with diverse resources and capabilities, the partnership has the resilience to maintain a shared vision while having a strong counterbalance to Beijing. India’s External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar explains how the Quad “reflects the growth of a multipolar order” and that the new global order needs “more” collaboration. Quad initiatives, such as Malabar, fortify trust between 2+2 and quadrilateral partnerships, improving the interoperability between the members. 

China’s extensive anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities that cover the First Island Chain, which entails Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Indonesia, are the threat that drives the Quad’s cooperation. With the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) goal of modernizing naval vessels and militarizing ports and overseas naval bases, the prospect of the PLAN's growing Southern Sea fleet intensifies challenges to the Quad’s strategic interests. China’s missile defense system, providing a layered defense system for offensive and defense purposes within the South China Sea regions, ranges from 540 to 1,000 nautical miles. This system includes frequent patrols by submarines and surrounding anti-ship ballistic missiles, significantly bolstering China’s A2/AD capability. The inclusion of advanced surveillance and communication systems (C4ISR) also strengthens China’s long-range and blue-water offensive capabilities. Beijing’s expanding maritime control and influence is why the Quad fortifies integration and interoperability to maintain presence and rule-based order in the Indo-Pacific. 

Illustrating China’s assertiveness, in August, three Chinese survey ships surrounded areas where the Indian government conducted military and space-related tests. Xiang Yong Hong 03, one of the survey ships, spent several weeks in July and August in the Bay of Bengal and at one point, 120 nautical miles where India announced it was holding sub-surface firing drills. The other two ships were the Yuan Wang 7, a ship used for satellite and missile tracking, and Zhong Shan Da Yue, an oceanographic research and training vessel. The PLAN has also recently intensified its presence in the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean by deploying three warships (He-Fei, Wuzhishan, and Qillanshan) to Sri Lanka for a port call in early September. Beijing’s economic investments and aid to Colombo show another maritime strategy in the Indo-Pacific. By enhancing China-Sri Lankan relations and investing in ports around the country, the PLAN utilizes this to move their fleets into the Indian Ocean, within India’s sphere of influence.

During Malabar 2024, the Quad navies focused on anti-submarine warfare and maritime interoperability. The exercise took place in the Bay of Bengal, a vital SLOC that links China, Japan, and the Korean Peninsula to the Middle East and Africa. Maintaining control and stability in the surrounding areas is crucial for maritime trade and energy supply. As a major shipping route, the ports around the Bay of Bengal handle 33 percent of global trade. In 2019, the United States had $1.9 trillion worth of trade in the region, underscoring the importance of global trade in the Indo-Pacific. While the Quad continues addressing China’s gray zone tactics and maritime blind spots, the recent antisubmarine exercises and India’s Security of Supply Arrangement with the United States, which secured over 500 advanced sonobuoys, upgraded reconnaissance, and undersea cable resilience, shows a focus on countering China’s expanding underwater capabilities. 

As China’s adventurism and power projection continue to accelerate throughout the Indo-Pacific, countering its expanding influence remains crucial for the Quad. With the region’s abundance of natural resources, SLOCs, and shared economic and security interests, strengthening the Quad’s security posture through regular joint exercises like Malabar is essential to safeguard stability in the free and open Indo-Pacific.