Brazilian and Uruguayan elections
In the last weeks, we read and heard several national discussions about the Brazilian and Uruguayan elections (two very similar yet profoundly different countries). However, I believe that it is very important to pay more attention to the regional effects of both elections.
Uruguay is known as one “the best democracies” in the region, making its elections particularly significant because their results send important signals to for the rest of Latin America.
From a political science perspective, it is interesting to see that two of the best-known “moderate left” countries in the region showed an important electoral weakening in these last elections. Even more significant, the left-leaning political parties of “Pepe” Mujica and “Lula” Da Silva are weakening as well. I think that this is the main point to consider beyond the result: that at the end of the day, the alternation of the power is natural in any kind of country. What might happen if Venezuela or Ecuador had a more transparent democracy?
Now, from a political economy perspective, I think that the main point to consider is that in coming years, we will face a new and unknown era of leftist governments: unlike in previous decades when the left enjoyed the “commodity boom”—which, in my perspective, is the main reason of their success—these future left wing governments will face a new, more challenging economic climate than the one we saw some years ago. The first traces of this new regional era can be seen in Venezuela’s recent decision to import oil.
I would also like to point out at least two elements on the regional consequences of these elections: The first is that the region will face many challenges in the next years. I would like to remark on two well-established topics that rank among the top of the list of challenges: poverty and inequality. Now the problem is not the poor in general, but rather, the vulnerable population (that group that is neither living in poverty nor has entered into the middle class). In light of the last report by the UNDP that says, “one third of Latin Americans risk falling into poverty”, it is very interesting to see that although the middle class in Latin American grew by 82 million people, from 21% of the population in 2000 to 34% in 2012, the vulnerable population has also grown from 35% of the population in 2000 to 38% in 2012. So we did not develop a solid and long-term strategy to solve this problem and in some extent, we can say that the region did not take advantage of the “gold decade”.
Now, what strategy should Latin American countries adopt to solve this situation? The answer to this question is problematic for the future because the region’s leaders tend to structure policy around “crony presidentialism” (“amiguimo presidencial”). Leaders fail to improve the living conditions of the vulnerable population because they operate on a mutual cooperation model based on “amiguismo” rather than a formal structure.
I believe is that this is one of the main reasons why the region (or at least its southern portion) did not exhibit important progress in economic integration, as its leaders are not interested in achieving it. These countries believe that in the end, what solves the problems “are the presidential friendships”, not the institutions. Mujica defines this as in Latin America, “lo político está por encima de lo jurídico” (“The politics are above the law”). This attitude resonates and expands throughout the region as the leaders change and enter political systems with no solid regional structures to base their relations. That is the reason why many countries in the region paid overwhelming attention to the results of the elections of Brazil.
Finally, as I mentioned in my latest book, I believe that Latin America –and specifically Dilma Rousseff – needs to talk less about development and start to put development policies into practice.