The Ukraine Showdown and the Parties Involved

Earlier this week, a ceasefire agreement for the fighting in eastern Ukraine was patched together in Minsk, Belarus over the course of sixteen hours by the leaders of Russia, Germany, France, and the Ukraine. Among its eleven points, the agreement most notably withdraws heavy weapons by both the rebels and the Ukrainian government, releases all illegally detained individuals, and restores Ukrainian sovereignty throughout its borders. Unsurprisingly, this ceasefire is on pace to last even shorter than a similar one signed earlier on September 5th, 2014; on the eve of its implementation, Saturday at midnight, tens were killed and wounded in fighting over Debaltseve. Regardless of the success of the ceasefire, its formative negotiations have helped illuminate the different foreign policy objectives in the region.

For obvious reasons, Russia remains the elephant in the room. Ever since its annexation of Crimea last March, the Kremlin has been waging a proxy war against the Ukrainian government with nationalist rebel states, such as the Donetsk People’s Republic and Luhansk People’s Republic under its wing. As of the most recent ceasefire talks, Russia still claims that it has had no role in supporting these movements, despite overwhelming intelligence suggesting the supplying of arms, espionage, and military guidance. Their claims are further undermined by the thousands of Russian troops that have been amassed on its border with the Ukraine and have been actively maneuvering for months. Vladimir Putin has invested far too much, be it the economic solvency of his country or the prestige of the Russian government, to simply pull out of this conflict with nothing to show for it. In light of recent US/NATO talks to arm Ukraine with lethal, albeit defensive, force, escalation appears inevitable- and Putin most certainly has a contingency plan ready for it.

Looking further west, Germany appears content to let the dice fall as they may. Chancellor Angela Merkel has been a staunch advocate for a non-military solution to the conflict. As the head of state for a country both incredibly apprehensive of the thought of war and dependent on Russian natural gas, Chancellor Merkel has led the charge on European Union sanctions against Russia and greater domestic energy independence, but little else. She was even opposed to the precautionary stationing of NATO troops in Poland and the Baltic. While the chancellor can point to the crippling of the ruble and the alienation of Russia as successes of her policy, she would be remiss to ignore the fact that Putin seems unfazed by it all. Indeed, President Putin is more than willing to pay the price of weakened economy, if it buys him the time to subvert the Ukrainian government and to weaken its sovereignty within its own borders. However, there are signs that the German government might be changing its tune on the subject of military intervention. Both leading military and political figures, such as the president of the armed forces association, André Wüstner, parliamentary defense commissioner Hellmut Königshaus, and Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen, are spearheading budget reform that would greatly increase funding for the military and allow it to be a relevant presence on the international scene. Clearly, the nation is at a crossroads. In the event of conflict escalation, Germany will be forced to decide between being haunted by the specter of its military history, or assuming the policing burdens that come with being the leading nation in Western Europe.

The weight of the Ukrainian conflict extends well past the borders of the European continent. The United States finds its interests seeded in the well-being of the current Ukrainian government, one that seeks inclusion in the European Union and hopes to distance itself from its Russian past. Up to this point, American support has been primarily ancillary. It had been limited to non-military goods and support for economic sanctions against Russia. Now, however, the United States congress is debating the possibility of supplying the Ukrainian government with defensive military assistance, in the form of anti-tank missile launchers, surveillance drones, radar jammers, etc. President Obama’s previous willingness to supply Syrian rebels with military aid against both Assad and the Islamic State leaves little doubt that debate over the subject is merely a formality. Successful Russian expansion into the Ukraine would be a clear act of imperialism, directly challenging the balance of power between itself and the European Union, one that would be incompatible with United States foreign policy. Unfortunately, Russia sees the supplying of the Ukraine with military assistance as incompatible with its own foreign policy. Per the “state-approved” Sputnik News website, such assistance by the United States to the war-mongering state of the Ukraine would be perceived as “mission creep,” reminiscent of the Vietnam War. This would provoke greater Russian involvement in the region as a result. The United States therefore finds itself in a tight spot, as current policy has done little to dissuade President Putin and many signs seem to indicate an escalation of involvement in the near future.

As dire as these economic circumstances might be for the west, China is making the most of the situation. Russia’s disconnect with the rest of Europe has forced it to pivot its gas exportation business, the cornerstone of its treasury, towards Asia. Russian companies such as Gazprom and Rosneft are undertaking massive construction projects, most notably, the Power of Siberia pipeline, so as to provide the infrastructure for the decade-long deals being signed between the Russians and the Chinese. Despite the decline of China’s growth, it still stands as an extremely valuable partner to Russia. If Russia pursues more aggressive and explicit policies against the Ukraine, China might indeed be the one state that keeps it afloat, financially.

No matter the perspective, the Ukraine conflict is becoming increasingly more tense as the days go by. Russia is too firmly entrenched in the region, and has taken far too much flak, both economically and to its prestige, to accept a ceasefire and respect a return to the status quo. Deterrence should still be the ultimate goal. However, the likelihood of war is exponentially amplified by Russia’s willingness to interpret any serious foreign intervention as a threat to its sovereignty. The cost of smothering Putin’s doctrine of nationalist expansion in its infancy may be high - but history has shown that the cost of the passive alternative may be even higher.