Caspian Sea Summit: Reviewing "Foreign Militaries" Presence in the Caspian Region

During the latest Caspian Sea Summit – the fourth of its kind – the states bordering the largest contained body of water in the planet agreed, among several outstanding issues, to exclude the presence of “foreign militaries” in the region. The move is seen as a statement of political cohesion in the region after many years of disagreement. Notably, Azerbaijan had resisted such a declaration because of its strong relationship with the United States – as part of the Afghanistan distribution network – which has allowed the Caucasian state to develop its Navy. The other young Caspian states, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, have also received foreign aid for their militaries. These relationships might go under stronger scrutiny after the Caspian Sea Summit, with probable significant consequences for states like the United States and China who have both invested military technology for weaker states in the region.

Before 1991, the former Soviet Union and Iran vied to ensure that the Caspian Sea’s resources would remain in the hands of the Caspian states, and the geopolitical situation at the time made this arrangement simple. However, the fall of the Soviet Union, which saw the ascendance of Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Russia as new players in the region. Since then, the five states have attempted to resolve disputes over the rights to the resources in the Caspian Sea. In recent years, this has fueled a wave of naval armament in the region which has led the smaller states of the region to seek outside help for developing a more potent form of deterrence. Azerbaijan, the only state in the region that can ship natural gas to the world without transporting it via Russia, called for American military aid in 2009 after Iran moved an oil rig close to Azerbaijan’s territorial waters. Baku, after having realized that it did not have the strength to face up to a Caspian threat to its resources or territorial integrity, pleaded the United States to help build up its naval capacities. In 2011, the State Department produced a policy paper outlining the goals of military aid to Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Turkemistan – they were aimed at increasing the three states’ capabilities to deter threats from both Iran and Russia.

In tandem, China has also been involved in propping up the region’s militaries. Just in May of 2014, it was reported that the Chinese are bidding to make a warship for Kazakhstan. Azerbaijan, two weeks prior to the Caspian Sea Summit, held its first military exposition to attract military contractors. However, in face of the newest declaration from the Caspian summit, it can appear as though the neighboring states are no longer seeing themselves as threatening to each other. Realistically, the chances of China or the United States bidding to create a military port in the Caspian Sea are close to none – though that never appeared to be a main concern. This declaration can signify that the Caspian littoral neighborhood is going to negotiate their disputes with less muscle-flexing and more organized dialog; maintaining the current military balance of power. Hitting an optimistic note, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that a permanent agreement on Caspian Sea disputes could be finished in the next year. Nonetheless, the statements from the other Caspian countries’ appeared more distant about the possibility of a breakthrough.

Now that the armed forces issue has been resolved, the Caspian states have to look forward to other outstanding differences that have prevented a comprehensive resolution: territorial waters and the future of a “Trans-Caspian” Pipeline. The two are intrinsically connected. The proposed Pipeline envisions the connection Turkmenistan’s gas to Azerbaijan’s gas distribution infrastructure through the Caspian Sea. This would make Turkmenistan the second country in the region to distribute gas to the outside world without using Russian facilities. For many years, Russia has attempted to prevent such a breakthrough with success, but since the beginning of the Ukrainian crisis, natural gas recipients in the West have begun to call for the diversification of European gas sources, and consequently the Trans-Caspian Pipeline has once again become a stellar project. Russia and Iran, the most vocal opponents of the Pipeline, maintain that such ventures must be agreed upon by all states in the region – in light of the fact that they collectively share on the resources in the entire body of water – whereas Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan contend that it is only the matter of the two contracting parties and their respective territorial waters. Subsequently, as long as the territorial borders of the Caspian Sea remain disputed, the Trans-Caspian Pipeline will be stalled from completion, and negotiations will have to continue. How the newest declaration against foreign military “presence” will factor into this drama remains to be seen.