ANALYSIS: A Peek into Xi’s Playbook: What Beijing is Learning from Ukraine

Chinese officials have shied away from comparisons between the Russian war in Ukraine and their own territorial claims to Taiwan (Wikimedia Commons). 

The Chinese Communist Party Congress ended Saturday, October 22, leaving President Xi Jinping with a third term as General Secretary of the CCP and unprecedented power. Xi’s consolidation of power has led many foreign policy experts to raise concerns about  a possible Chinese invasion of Taiwan and analyze potential parallels between the situation in Taiwan and the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

The 20th Party Congress bodes poorly for peaceful relations between China and Taiwan. In a speech delivered during the opening session of Congress, Xi stated that China “will never promise to renounce the use of force, and… reserve[s] the option of taking all measures necessary,” according to a government readout of Xi’s address,  from The People’s Daily.

Xi’s strong rhetoric towards Taiwan eerily resembles the war-like language of the Kremlin. It’s uncertain how Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has affected the Chinese approach to Taiwan. From the outset of the war, however, Xi has closely monitored the situation in Ukraine and used it to inform China’s Taiwan policy. According to Jun Wu Tan, these practices can be seen in Chinese media, which reported the importance of limiting internet access to restrict information flows, domestically and in the West. 

Casimir Yost, who previously served on the National Intelligence Council and is currently a Senior Fellow at Georgetown’s Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, shared his speculations with The Caravel.

In Mr. Yost’s analysis, the international response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has surprised the Chinese. The “degree of cohesion in NATO and the EU with respect to the invasion” has been greater than anticipated. “[The Chinese have] been surprised by the willingness of NATO countries and the US in particular to resupply Ukraine.”

There are, however, notable differences between the international community’s attitude towards Ukraine and Taiwan. Ukraine, unlike Taiwan, is recognized by the United Nations, whereas only 13 U.N. states recognize Taiwan’s statehood. Additionally, Ukraine has ambassador-level diplomatic relations with more than 180 states, including global hegemons like the United States and China. By contrast, Taiwan only has full diplomatic relations with a handful of countries, none of which are major superpowers.

From the onset of the war in Ukraine, though, President Joe Biden maintained that the United States would not deploy troops to Ukraine. In Taiwan, however, President Biden has been less direct, adopting a policy of “strategic ambiguity.” This lies on the backbone of the Taiwan Relations Act, passed in 1979. However, the act does not specify whether the U.S is obligated to militarily defend Taiwan in the event of Chinese invasion, although Taiwan does currently enjoy quasi-support from the U.S. Unlike Ukraine, Taiwan has had the ability to purchase arms from the United States. In July of 2019, The U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency announced a defense sale valued at approximately $2.2B USD, which would enhance the island’s ability to defend itself against Chinese invasion.

It is not clear whether this level of global cooperation, and the possibility of a more direct response in Taiwan, will deter Xi.

Another factor that may affect China’s decision to invade is the economic crisis presently facing Russia.

The global community hit Russia with a wide array of economic shocks following its invasion of Ukraine. Russia’s access to the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) was severed, jeopardizing its ability to power financial transactions, and effectively freezing its assets, Foreign Policy reports. The international community has also imposed a wide array of sanctions on the Russian economy. In Yost’s assessment, sanctions against Russia have effectively slowed the economy, as “indicators seem to suggest that GDP is declining.” Other technical sanctions have undermined Russian military capabilities. What’s uncertain, though, “is whether they are reaching a point or will reach a point where this has a decisive impact on Russian decision making,” according to the International Institute for Sustainable Development.

Yost proposed that sanctions against China would be much more difficult to implement than those against Russia. China’s economy is more globally integrated than Russia’s. It would be difficult to achieve the “comprehensive approach” taken with Russia, as many economies, especially those in South Asia, are extremely reliant on Chinese exports.

China, also, is historically more capable of surviving economic turmoil. Foreign Policy reported China’s extensive history of financial hardship saying “The CCP survived three decades of worse poverty than experienced by the Soviet Union at the time, a self-inflicted depression in 1989-90 paralleling in some respects the events that ended the Soviet Union, the global financial crisis, and another partly self-inflicted economic wound via China’s determination to maintain its zero-COVID policy in 2021-22.” This societal will to endure may negate the effects of economic sanctions.

China has also learned from Russia’s failed military strategies in Ukraine. This may encourage a continuation of “gray zone” conflict strategies in Taiwan. These are a mix between cooperation and armed conflict, in the Atlantic Council’s description, rather than full-fledged military operations. Traditional military operations are far more susceptible to failure, as we’ve seen in Ukraine, and are even more difficult to perform on an island such as Taiwan. Thus, according to analysis in The Diplomat, Beijing may choose to maintain its strategy of isolating Taiwan “through diplomatic, economic, and military measures” or even “aerial and/or naval blockades.”

Unlike Russia, China has not fought in a war since 1979, in Vietnam. However, military analysts speculate that China’s military is better prepared for a combative conflict than Russia’s. Many of Russia's military failures have resulted from poor ground operations, ineffective supplies, weak communications, and outdated weapons. Conversely, China has engaged in a series of reforms to strengthen its military power, increasing defense spending by 740 percent from 1992 to 2017. The government has directed this spending towards advanced technology, including 2,200 conventionally armed ballistic and cruise missiles. 

Both Ukraine and Taiwan face threats by massive authoritarian regimes helmed by an often-unrestrained ruler. The war in Ukraine has often been regarded as a personal endeavor of President Vladimir Putin, denoted as “‘man’s mission’ disguised as a ‘national mission.’” With Xi exceeding the typical two term limit of Chinese Presidents, he may feel empowered to pursue unrestrained actions in Taiwan.

Chinese officials have been reluctant to recognize a similarity between Ukraine and Taiwan. At the onset of the war, Hua Chunying, spokesperson of the Chinese Foreign Ministry asserted that “Taiwan is not Ukraine,” according to The New York Times. The course of events in Ukraine have proved this sentiment true. It is still, however, essential that government officials and analysts alike monitor both situations with an association in mind.