Not THAAD Again
South Koreans protest THAAD and condemn Moon Jae-In’s presidency in May 2020. (Source: Flickr)
South Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs Chung Eui-yong met with Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi in Xiamen, China on April 3. This meeting marked the first time in three years that a South Korean Foreign Minister visited China—tensions sparked in 2016 over the placement of a U.S. anti-missile system in South Korea that led to an unofficial cultural and economic boycott between the two countries.
In a statement following the meeting, Minister Chung revealed that “as soon as the COVID-19 situation stabilizes, we have decided to promote President Xi's visit to Korea as early as possible.” However, there was a disparity from China’s side: in the meeting reports posted by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, there was no mention of President Xi's upcoming visit to Korea.
So why the discrepancy between the two statements? Why would South Korea emphasize a visit by President Xi but not China?
The Powers THAAD Be
The contemporary history of the two countries harkens back to the Korean War in 1950 when China sent the People’s Liberation Army to support the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea against the combined forces of the Republic of Korea and the United States. Following the Korean Armistice Agreement that was signed in 1953, the People’s Republic of China maintained relations with North Korea, while South Korea established diplomatic relations with the Republic of China in Taiwan.
But with the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, economic benefits overtook political ideology as a primary consideration in East Asian diplomacy. China expanded economic relations throughout Asia, and the growing global market precipitated new opportunities for cooperation between China and South Korea. In the face of these opportunities, China’s mutual economic benefits with South Korea began to outweigh its ideological and political ties with North Korea. By 1992, diplomatic ties between Seoul and Taipei were severed, and formal diplomatic relations were established between Seoul and Beijing instead.
Since 2004, China has been South Korea’s lead trading partner. Bilateral trade rose from $6.4 billion at the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1992 to more than $145 billion in 2007. In 2017, the trade volume between China and Korea had reached $280.26 billion.
THAAD’s What Happened
Tensions spiked again between China and South Korea in 2016 regarding the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), a U.S. anti-ballistic missile defense system designed to shoot down short-, medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles in their terminal phase.
Though South Korea initially made plans to develop its own long-range missile defense system, North Korea increased a sense of urgency when it launched a long-range satellite on February 2, 2016. By July of that same year, South Korea announced that it would be importing THAAD technology and deploying it on Korean soil by the end of 2017.
The 50 percent of domestic respondents that were in favor of THAAD cited the official reasoning, which was that U.S. deployment of the THAAD system would help counter North Korean missile threats. However, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi expressed concerns that the deployment of THAAD in South Korea, despite being directed at North Korea, could jeopardize neighboring China's “legitimate national security interests.”
Viewing the installation of THAAD as a preemptive U.S. security measure, China urged South Korea to stand firm against U.S. encroachment into East Asian waters and urged against landing itself into an undesirable commitment with the U.S. The THAAD system would be able to detect an intercontinental ballistic missile fired from China heading towards the U.S. mainland.
Domestic reactions to THAAD were mixed. The decision to deploy the system was initially made under Former South Korean President Park Geun-hye’s administration, and though current South Korean President Moon Jae-in campaigned to halt THAAD deployment pending further evaluations, the first launchers became operational in May 2017. The resulting boycott of South Korean goods was the start of a still-ongoing economic standoff between South Korea and China.
THAAD’s What You Get
On August 21, 2017, Chinese Ambassador to South Korea Qiu Guohong emphasized, “THAAD is the greatest obstacle to developing China-South Korea relations and the most difficult problem since the establishment of diplomatic relations.”
In particular, the Korean conglomerate Lotte Group, which provided the Seongju site in South Korea for THAAD’s construction, was a major target of the boycotts. The Lotte World amusement parks under construction in Shenyang and Chengdu, China at the time were both suspended due to popular pressure. 75 Lotte Mart stores in China were shut down, citing inspection failures.
EXO performs their title song ‘Monster’ as a nine-membered group in 2016. (Source: Wikimedia Commons)
The Korean pop (K-pop) industry is also one that has been greatly affected by the boycott. China is one of the biggest target markets for K-pop companies, and since the 2000s, companies have consistently recruited Chinese trainees to appeal to the Chinese audience. But with the unofficial boycott of all things South Korean, Korean celebrity activities in China have been limited, and K-pop idols typically operate under a Chinese label to host activities in China. Streaming services for South Korean music and dramas were blocked, while celebrities were frequently denied visas.
For example, EXO, a popular nine-member K-pop boy group under the Korean label SM Entertainment, has had to operate as eight since 2017. Their sole Chinese member Zhang Yixing, stage name Lay, has been left out of EXO albums since the start of the boycott and only made solo appearances in China under a different label and outside of his group.
South Korea’s tourism industry was also hit hard by the boycott, losing an estimated $15.6 billion in revenue that year. A report from the Hyundai Research Institute further projected that plummeting Chinese tourism would cost South Korea some 402,000 jobs in lost production per year.
Consequently, South Korea’s public opinion of China has also dropped; in 2018, more than 58 percent of Koreans reported a negative perception of China, which was a 25 percent increase from 2016.
Lessening of Tensions?
China and South Korea have both taken steps to improve relations. The April 3rd meeting is the latest in a series of attempts to reestablish footing for diplomatic advancement; a visit by Chinese President Xi Jinping would greatly aid South Korea in lessening the unofficial boycott on its goods.
In the spirit of reconciliation, China has lifted some economic sanctions, notably on Lotte Group, in May 2019 when the municipal government of Shenyang gave the company permission to resume work on the $2.6 billion Lotte Town shopping and leisure development. Last December, China approved a South Korean video game for the first time in nearly four years, issuing a license for the game “Summoners War” to be sold in the Chinese market.
Although China has been easing its unofficial boycott on South Korea, relations remain uncertain. As seen with the differing statements from Minister Chung and Minister Wang, miscommunication and missteps abound.