Russia Launches Airstrike on Turkish-Backed Militia Amid Growing International Tensions

Idlib province, which shares a border with Turkey, is the site of much conflict as well as the recent airstrike. (Wikimedia Commons)

An estimated 78 members of Faylaq al-Sham, a Syrian militia endorsed by the Turkish government, were killed following an airstrike conducted by the Russian military on October 26. The target was a known training camp of the militia in the Syrian province of Idlib. The attack was also responsible for the deaths of an unknown number of civilians, according to local sources.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan promptly condemned the attack, citing it as an indicator of Russia’s “unwillingness to achieve lasting peace” in Idlib. Additionally, he reasserted the legitimacy of his country’s presence in the province: “I repeat once again that we have a legitimate reason to intervene at any moment. We feel the need to.”

This is reminiscent of an earlier statement of his, where he claimed that it is of utmost importance to “transform Idlib into a safe place at any cost for the sake of both Turkey and the region's people.”  

Idlib province is wracked by war: jihadists, Kurds, rebels, the Syrian government, and the Turkish military all are vying for control. Understandably, the Turkish government is not fond of having a war zone on their border, across which an estimated 900,000 Syrian migrants have fled to Turkey in recent months due to displacement.

Turkish troops first established outposts in Idlib in 2017, immediately clashing with local jihadist forces. It was during these initial skirmishes that Turkey found an ally in Faylaq al-Sham, which was engaged in conflict with rival militias and Kurdish forces, another enemy of Turkey. Since then, the Turkish government has routinely sent Faylaq al-Sham—as well as several other Syrian militias—to serve in proxy conflicts abroad. 

Idlib is only a small operation when compared to Turkey’s larger attempts to solidify itself as the dominant power of the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East. The country is currently locked in a naval dispute with Greece and Cyprus over maritime borders and drilling rights; it sent mercenaries to Libya; it has allegedly supplied Azerbaijan with fighter jets in the conflict with Armenia over the Nagorno-Karabakh region. This puts them at odds with Russia, which has a defense pact with Armenia, exacerbating already existing tensions. 

As an ally of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, Russia has been launching airstrikes in the region since 2015 and has sent advisors to train governmental troops. Their alliance is largely pragmatic in nature: aside from the gratitude the al-Assad government would owe Russia due to their vital assistance, the civil war has proven to be a boon for the state-owned Russian arms industry.

Additionally, the al-Assad government leases the port of Tartus to the Russian navy, allowing free access to the Mediterranean Sea—which would also circumvent any attempt by Turkey to block off the Bosphorus strait. Russia considers this base to be of critical importance, especially since, if an unfriendly power is victorious in the civil war, their lease may be put in jeopardy. 

In short, it is in both Turkey’s and Russia’s interests to secure Syria in their sphere in influence while it is weakened by civil war. Consequently, it is in both countries’ interests to make sure that their opponent does not succeed. 

Cooler heads initially prevailed when both countries agreed to create a buffer zone in Idlib, in which neither party would launch attacks. However, this agreement was voided when the Syrian government entered the demilitarized region in August 2019. 

On February 27, at least 33 Turkish soldiers were killed in an airstrike during an offensive carried out by the al-Assad regime. The Russian government vehemently denies having any planes in the area at the time of the airstrike, though Putin met with his Turkish counterpart in March to settle a new demilitarization treaty. 

This second treaty still remains in effect, even during the recent airstrike. The question arises: why would Russia risk yet another international crisis in Syria?

The answer can likely be found in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, where, as is the case with the civil wars in Libya and Syria, Russia and Turkey are on opposing sides.

Russia seeks to avoid the same unfortunate circumstance forced upon Turkey: a messy war on its immediate border. For this reason, although they are more sympathetic to Armenia than Azerbaijan, the Kremlin has not endorsed either country, and has been working to establish several ceasefires—so far, without lasting success.

Faylaq al-Sham complicates matters, since they allegedly have fighters stationed in Azerbaijan, although both Turkey and Azerbaijan deny this claim. Their presence in the region, along with their benefactor’s several open endorsements of Azerbaijan, makes the peace negotiation process even more difficult. After all, it was during a meeting with the Turkish Foreign Minister himself that Azeri President Ilham Aliyev vowed his military will “go to the end” if the latest peace talks fail.

Almost 80 militiamen killed on October 26  sent a message to Erdoğan he couldn’t ignore: back off. The Kremlin has shown that it is willing to take extraordinary measures, such as breaking a nonaggression treaty, in order to punish a close ally of its rival. 

By making this move, however, they have opened a can of worms: Turkey may now seek to launch direct punitive attacks against pro-Russian militias around the world, or even target the al-Assad government. The recent events in Idlib must be viewed holistically as part of the larger struggle between two rising powers seeking hegemony in the Middle East.